On two previous occasions here and here, this blog has sought to address errors in a proposal put forward by author Emmett O’Regan, which purports to prove that the idea of a heretical Pope was formally excluded at the First Vatican Council.

Since that time however, the debate regarding this erroneous proposal has continued to progress, and therefore it seems opportune to comment on the further developments which have occurred. Key amongst these is that O’Regan has recently published a further May 2024 article in the peer reviewed journal Theological Studies, on the topic of his proposal entitled Is Bellarmine’s “Fourth Proposition” Identical with the “Extreme View” of Albert Pighius?, in response to criticisms by Dr. Christian D. Washburn of his previous contribution to that journal.

Further, on the social media platform now known as X (formerly Twitter – refer image below), O’Regan has communicated to me personally that he considers this new article also addresses the objections I have raised with his proposal in my own previous article A Misidentified Dogma – Misadventures in Peer Review.

To determine if O’Regan’s May 2024 article does in fact address the objections I have raised, this article will therefore identify the key new information and arguments O’Regan has introduced, and then assess if they succeed in making out a persuasive case for this proposal.

In doing this, it will also be kept in mind that the Church in its Canon Law, makes clear that no teaching of a Pope or Ecumenical Council should be understood as dogmatically defined “unless it is manifestly evident” (Canon 749 §3 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, Canon 1323 §3 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law). As such, the burden of proof in these arguments sits with those who would assert a dogmatic definition has occurred, a burden which can not be discharged by propositions which are merely possible or arguable.

For brevities sake, I will also assume readers are familiar with the background to this debate as set out in my previous articles here and here, and therefore the below should be read in conjunction with those prior contributions.

1.0 The Concession

In the first place, the most significant feature of O’Regan’s article appears not to be a new argument at all, but in fact a concession his initial article was based on a serious error.

In his November 2023 article, O’Regan has originally asserted that:

“Speaking on behalf of the Deputation De Fide, Gasser underscored the fact that a clause contained in St. Robert Bellarmine’s “fourth proposition” outlined in book 4, chapter VI of De Romano Pontifice was about to be raised to the “dignity of a dogma.”“

That is, O’Regan asserted the passage from Bellarmine that Gasser indicated would be raised to the dignity of a dogma came from book 4, chapter VI of Bellarmine’s book De Romano Pontifice (what O’Regan refers to as the Fourth Proposition), rather than a separate passage in book 4, chapter II (what O’Regan refers to as the Fourth Opinion) of that same work.

However, in his May 2024 article, O’Regan now concedes:

“First, I would like to acknowledge that there is no doubt that the controversy at hand in this portion of Gasser’s relatio is centered on the proposed definition of papal infallibility itself—that is, the “fourth opinion” outlined by Bellarmine, which he ascribes with the theological note of “most certain and assured,” rather than “probable and pious.” I think we can both agree on this conclusion.“

Given this was in fact the main error identified in my own criticism of O’Regan’s November 2023 article, I do of course agree with this new conclusion, and thank O’Regan for recognizing his previous error. This concession does not however cure the problems with O’Regan’s proposal overall, since as will be discussed further below, his alternative arguments for his proposal are also not persuasive.

2.0 Two Schools / One Opinion

Having finally accepted the dogma recognised by the First Vatican Council is only that stated in Bellarmine’s Fourth Opinion in book 4, chapter II of De Romano Pontifice, O’Regan goes on to offer an alternative argument as to why that Opinion rules out a heretical Pope, being that:

“First of all, Washburn appears to overlook the fact that Bellarmine mentions two different schools of papal infallibility within the single broader category identified as the fourth opinion … Upon reading on a little further, however, we can see exactly how Bellarmine distinguishes between the two competing schools of thought which are categorized under the fourth opinion: “These authors seem in some way to disagree with themselves because some of them say the Pontiff cannot err if he should proceed maturely and listen to the counsel of other pastors, while others say the Pope can err in no way whatsoever, even by himself.”

Therefore, there is a need to establish exactly which school of papal infallibility that Gasser confirmed was being elevated to dogmatic status. Bellarmine groups these two opposing schools of thought under the same broader category within the fourth opinion, since they both share common ground in two important areas …

The first school of thought in the fourth opinion is that which was first formulated by Bishop Guido Terreni (c. 1270–1342), before being further developed by the Dominican theologian Juan de Torquemada (1388–1468).³ This moderate form of papal infallibility allowed for the possibility that a pope could potentially teach heresy in a public capacity if he acted rashly, without consulting a body of counselors, such as the College of Cardinals. According to this version of the doctrine of papal infallibility, while the pope could potentially teach heresy as part of his public Magisterium, when he acts outside of the support of an advisory body, divine providence would always ensure that he could never define a heretical proposition ex cathedra …

The second school of thought categorized within the fourth opinion is that of Bellarmine and Suárez, who promoted a moderate form of papal infallibility that navigated a middle ground between Pighius and Torquemada. Over the course of the four propositions that are marshalled in defense of the fourth opinion, Bellarmine argues that the pope could never teach heresy in his public capacity as Roman pontiff, even when he teaches in a non-definitive capacity, without securing counsel from an advisory body. Therefore, Torquemada’s school of thought is clearly distinguishable from that of Bellarmine. Gasser’s intervention was made in order to confirm that it was the school of Bellarmine that was being “raised to the dignity of a dogma” in Pastor Aeternus, rather than Pighius’s extreme view in the third opinion.” [Emphasis added]

That is, O’Regan now argues when Gasser indicated it was the Fourth Opinion which was to be raised to the dignity of a dogma, Gasser actually meant that only one of the two opinions grouped by Bellarmine under the heading of the Fourth Opinion was to be so endorsed.

But that simply does not follow. When Gasser’s relatio refers to the Fourth Opinion without distinguishing between the variations which Bellarmine may have grouped within it, it is the commonalities between these variations which is being affirmed. That is why Bellarmine groups them as one opinion, and why Gasser endorses them as one opinion, because it is what unites them as one which is relevant.

Indeed, if this were not the case, Gasser’s relatio would not have referred to the Fourth Opinion. The relatio would instead, as O’Regan clearly in his motivated reasoning wishes it had, have referred to the more expansive Fourth Proposition.

Accordingly, this new argument of O’Regan is not persuasive, and should be dismissed.

3.0 A Retreaded Argument

A second alternative argument offered by O’Regan is not new, but in fact an old one which he has previously published in non-academic forums here and here, and which has previously been rebutted on this blog here.

This argument is, in essence, to note that:

• Bellarmine “goes on to list a total of four propositions outlining why the fourth opinion [from Chapter II] outlined above should be considered certain and positively asserted”; and
• That these include in fourth place Pighius’ view in Chapter VI that it “is probable and may piously be believed that not only as ‘Pope’ can the Supreme Pontiff not err, but he cannot be a heretic even as a particular person by pertinaciously believing something false against the faith”.

O’Regan then argues that, because Bellarmine’s fourth opinion in Chapter II has been raised to a dogma, so equally must have been made into dogma all the reasons given by Bellarmine in support of it.

However the absurdity of this argument can be shown by reference to a response by Dr. John P. Joy, in a paper which he initially made available online, and which was later published in a somewhat modified form in the journal Nova et Vetera (John P. Joy, ‘Disputed Questions on Papal Infallibility’, Nova et Vetera, vol. 19, no. 1, Winter 2021, Page 33-61.):

“[I]t must be said that this argument assumes that the First Vatican Council, by raising a conclusion of St. Robert Bellarmine to the status of a dogma, must also have made into dogmas all the reasons adduced by Bellarmine in support of his conclusion. But this does not follow. The official relatio explicitly states that it was not the intention of the council to dogmatize the extreme opinion of Albert Pighius, which Bellarmine describes as pious and probable (Msi 52: 1218 C). Rather, the doctrine contained in the council’s teaching is the ‘fourth opinion’ adduced by Bellarmine (Ibid.), which is that “in a certain measure, whether the pope can be a heretic or not, he cannot in any way define a heretical proposition that must be believed by the whole Church” (de Romano pontifice, IV, 2). This rules out the possibility of error when the pope defines a doctrine to be believed by the whole Church; but it does not rule out the possibility of error when the pope proposes a doctrine of faith or morals in his authentic magisterium without defining it as to be believed by the whole Church.

Now Bellarmine proceeds to offer four further propositions in support of this ‘fourth opinion’, one of which is indeed the position of Pighius. But it does not follow that the council’s endorsement of Bellarmine’s ‘fourth opinion’ entails an endorsement of all the further reasons adduced by him in support of that opinion, and it is especially absurd to argue that it entails an endorsement of that further proposition which the official relatio explicitly rejects as being contained in the meaning of its definition, according to the words of Bishop Gasser: “From this it appears that the doctrine contained in the schema is not that of Albert Pighius, nor of any extreme school…”” [Emphasis added]

In this regard, it is acknowledged that in his May 2024 article O’Regan attempts to ameliorate the force of the argument made by Dr. Joy in relation to the absurdity of reading Gasser’s relatio as endorsing the view of Pighius that it elsewhere explicitly rejects, by suggesting there are subtle differences between Bellarmine’s Fourth Proposition in Chapter VI and Pighius’s extreme view outlined as Bellarmine’s Third Opinion in Chapter II.

However this defense can not be accepted, as regardless of any difference between these two views which existed either in the mind of Bellarmine or in reality, Gasser’s relatio explicitly identifies the Fourth Proposition in Chapter VI as being the opinion of Pighius:

“Bellarmine himself who, in book 4, chapter VI, pronounces on the opinion of Pighius in the following words: “It can be believed probably and piously that the supreme Pontiff is not only not able to err as Pontiff but that even as a particular person he is not able to be heretical, by pertinaciously believing something contrary to the faith.”

Accordingly for Gasser’s relatio, there can be no doubt the Fourth Proposition in Chapter VI is identified with Pighius’ extreme opinion, which is explicitly rejected as being raised to the dignity of a dogma.

Therefore, similar to the Two Schools / One Opinion argument, the Retreaded Argument must also be rejected as clearly in error.